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THE THIRD ABRAHAM L.
POMERANTZ LECTURE
The First Amendment and
Government Regulation of Economic
Markets
INTRODUCTION
Roberta S. Karmel*
To a securities lawyer, the idea that all, or significant por-
tions, of the federal securities laws violate the first amendment
and, therefore, are unconstitutional seems preposterous. Yet, it
also seems preposterous that pornography is protected by the
first amendment and sales literature for securities products is
not. This distinction between artistic and commercial speech
may be explainable historically, but it is difficult to justify intel-
lectually. Moreover, the line between politics and economics is a
fine one. A free society depends on economic freedom as well as
political freedom. The free movement of capital is an essential
component of democracy.
Securities regulation is essentially the regulation of speech.
Further, because of the mechanics of the statutory construction
of the federal securities laws, a fair amount of prior restraint is
imposed on speech by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). For example, the SEC can prevent the sale of securities
products and, therefore, capital-raising activities by business en-
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terprise through the registration provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933.1 Similarly, the SEC can censor statements concerning
tender offers2 and proxy solicitations.3 Another obvious first
amendment question involves the regulation of financial
newsletters.4
The following Articles discuss the interplay between the
first amendment and government regulation of information in
the securities market. They were delivered at a symposium
sponsored by Brooklyn Law School on November 15, 1988.
Professor Burt Neuborne, who delivered the third Abraham
L. Pomerantz Lecture at the symposium, posits the controversial
thesis that commercial speech, such as information about securi-
ties products, is hearer-centered whereas political speech is
speaker-centered. Accordingly, although commercial speech is
protected, it does not prevent the government from forcing dis-
closure necessary to permit hearers to make informed and au-
tonomous choices. Using this standard, Professor Neuborne con-
tends that SEC regulation that promotes such an objective is
valid, but other regulation may well be unconstitutional. How-
ever, Professor Neuborne believes that persons subject to SEC
regulation are well served by such regulation and unlikely to
challenge it.
The commentators on Professor Neuborne's paper disagree
with Neuborne on various grounds. Benjamin M. Vandegrift ar-
ticulates the viewpoint of the securities practitioner on these
matters. He points out that commercial firms have on occasion
successfully challenged SEC regulations on free speech grounds.
Professor Arthur R. Pinto argues that the government should be
permitted to regulate the capital markets because of the special
nature of those markets and the role of information in adding
value to securities. Further, since in his view the issue is one of
policy rather than constitutionality, he believes that economic
policy decisions should be left to Congress and the SEC rather
than the courts.
Judge Ralph K. Winter questions Professor Neuborne's dis-
See Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d) & 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7Sm(d) & n(e).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988) (Rule 14a-9) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1988)
(Rule 14a-11). See also Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985).
See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
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tinction between hearer-centered and speaker-centered free
speech protection and points out that securities legislation tran-
scends ordinary discourse between a speaker and an audience.
Professor Henry Monaghan also questions the distinction be-
tween hearer-centered and speaker-centered speech as a meth-
odology for explaining the principles for limiting commercial
speech. In addition, he questions the distinction between com-
mercial and other protected speech.
The debate reflected in this Symposium is significant not
only because of the legal issues discussed, but also because capi-
tal formation is a crucial economic function. Although it seems
safe to assume that the SEC will not be dismantled by first
amendment litigation, it is nevertheless probable that first
amendment concerns will propel changes in various aspects of
securities regulation. What rationale the courts will use in bal-
ancing the public interest in preventing and suppressing fraud in
the capital markets against the first amendment protection of
speech is an interesting question which is differently addressed
by each of the authors.
1989]

